Abstract
Introduction
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of wireless mobile stations that collaborate to facilitate communications between themselves without invention of fixed wire/wireless infrastructure. The topology of the network changes dynamically as nodes move and the nodes reorganize themselves to enable communications with nodes beyond their immediate wireless communications range by relaying messages for one another [1] .
MANET relies on the cooperation of all the participating nodes. The more nodes cooperate the more powerful a MANET becomes. But supporting MANET requires detecting routes and forwarding packets [2] which may cost them to loose their energy [3] . Therefore there is a strong motivation for a node to deny packet forwarding to other, while at the same time using their services to deliver own data.
Current schemes of detecting node misbehavior in MANET are mostly centered on using incentives, reputation [4] or price-based mechanisms [5] to achieve the desired effect of nodes cooperation. In an ad hoc network one of the major concerns is how to increase the routing security in presence of malicious nodes. In our approach we calculate trust values of nodes based on certain attributes and by using appropriate threshold values. We have classified the nodes in to three categories based on their trust values. This paper is focused on introducing a new trust enhanced model suitable for application to ad-hoc networks. Section 2 presents a DSR routing protocol. Section 3 details the security attack in MANET. We investigate the proposed scheme in section 4. Section 5 elaborates on the simulation environment and the experimental results. In Section 6, we present our conclusion.
DSR Protocol
DSR is an entirely on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol [6] composed of two parts: Route Discovery and Route Maintenance. In this section, we describe the basic form of Route Discovery and Route maintenance in DSR.
In DSR, when a node has a packet to send to some destination and does not currently have a route to that destination in its Route Cache, the node initiates Route Discovery to find a route; this node is known as the initiator of the Route Discovery, and the destination of the packet is known as the Discovery's target. The initiator transmits a Route Request (RREQ) packet as a local broadcast, specifying the target and a unique identifier from the initiator. Each node receiving the Route Request, if it has recently seen this request identifier from the initiator, discards the Request. Otherwise, it appends its own node address to a list in the Request and rebroadcasts the Request. When the Route Request reaches its target node, the target sends a Route Replay (RREP) back to the initiator of the Request, including a copy of the accumulated list of addresses from the Request. When the Replay reaches the initiator of the Request, it caches the new route in its Route Cache.
Route Maintenance is the mechanism by which a node sending a packet along a specified route to some destination detects if that route has broken, for example because two nodes in it have moved too apart. DSR is based on source routing: when sending a packet, the originator lists in the header of the packet the complete sequence of nodes through which the packet is forwarded. Each node along the route forwards the packet to the next hop indicated in the packet's header, and attempts to confirm this by means of a link-layer acknowledgment or network layer acknowledgment. If, after a limited number of local retransmissions of the packet, a node in the route is unable to make this confirmation, it returns a Route Error to the original source of packet, identifying the link from itself to the next node was broken. The sender then removes this broken link from its Route Cache; for subsequent packets to its destination, the sender may use any other route to its destination in its Cash, or it may attempt a new Route Discovery for that target if necessary. Since DSR has no security mechanism they are vulnerable to many type of attacks. It assumes all nodes cooperate in the network so in its present status cannot defend itself from attacks.
Security attacks in MANET
The main assumption of the ad hoc routing protocols is that all participating nodes do so in good faith and without maliciously disrupting the operation of the protocol [6, 7] . However, the existence of malicious entities cannot be disregarded in any system, especially in open ones like ad hoc networks. The RPSEC IETF working group has performed a threat analysis that is applicable to routing protocols employed in a wide range of application scenarios [8] . According to this study, the routing function can be disrupted by internal or external attackers. An internal attacker can be any legitimate participant of the routing protocol. An external attacker is defined as any other entity. The strongest assumption for an external attacker is that it is able to eavesdrops the communication between two legitimate network participants, inject fabricated messages and delete, alter or replay captured packets. Weaker assumptions of external attackers include the ability to inject messages but not read them, or read and replay messages but not inject new ones, or just the ability to read messages. Cryptographic solutions can be employed to prevent the impact of external attackers by mutual authentication of the participating nodes through digital signature schemes [9] . However, the underlying protocols should also be considered since an attacker could manipulate a lower level protocol to interrupt a security mechanism in a higher level. Although these attacks are a significant part of a complete threat assessment, our analysis focuses only on network-layer threats and countermeasures. Internal attackers have the capabilities of the strongest outside attacker, as they are legitimate participants of the routing process. Having complete access to the communication link they are able to advertise false routing information at will and force arbitrary routing decisions on their peers [10] .
One of the most difficult to detect problems in routing is that of Byzantine failures.
These failures are the result of nodes that behave in a way that does not comply with the protocol. The reasons for the erroneous behavior could be software or hardware faults, mistakes in the configuration, or malicious compromises. Attempts to solve the problem of Byzantine failures have been proposed for both infrastructures [11] and infrastructure less networks [13] .
Based on this threat analysis and the identified capabilities of the potential attackers, we will now discuss several specific attacks [10, 8, 13, 14, 15 and 16] that can target the operation of a routing protocol in an ad hoc network.
A Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme classifies the relationship among the nodes and their neighboring nodes in to three types as below. The relationship between any node x and node y will be determined according to the number of messages sent/received to/from y and it is given as follows:
-Node x have never sent/received any messages to/from node y. -Trust levels between them are very low. -Probability of malicious behaviour is very high. -Newly arrived nodes are grouped in to this category.
Known (K):
-Node x have sent/received some messages to/from node y. -Trust levels between them are neither low nor too high.
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Friend (F):
− Node x have sent/received plenty of messages to/from node y. -Trust levels between them are very high. -Probability of malicious behaviour is very less. The above relationships (i.e. for node 1) are represented in a Figure1 which is part of every node in the ad hoc network. Also, it is assumed that the relationship between nodes is asymmetric. This is evaluated based on the trust levels assigned for its neighbor. Asymmetric relationships suggest that the direction of data Flow may be more in one direction. In other words, node x may not have trust on node y the same way as node y has trust on node x or vice versa. The Threshold parameters are design parameters. Simulation is to be carried out with suitable values or all the parameters and the threshold thrust levels so as to obtain optimum performance. There is a trade off between offering good security in ad hoc networks and overall throughput of the network. Hence, choosing an optimal value is crucial for the good functioning of the network.
Route Selection:
When any node wishes to send messages to a distant node, it sends the ROUTE REQUEST to all the neighboring nodes. The ROUTE REPLY obtained from its neighbor is sorted by trust ratings. The source selects the most trusted path. If its one hop neighbor node is a friend, then that path is chosen for message transfer. If its one-hop neighbor node is a known or unknown and if the one hop neighbor of the second Best path is a friend chooses F.
Similarly an optimal path is chosen based on the degree of Relationship existing between the neighbor nodes. The source selects the shortest and the next shortest path. Whenever a neighboring node is a friend, the message transfer is done immediately. This eliminates the overhead of invoking the trust estimator between friends. If it is a known or unknown, transfer is done based on the ratings. This protocol will converge to the DSR protocol if all the nodes in the ad hoc network are friends
Simulation and Results
For the performance simulation of the protocol extensions, a regular well-behaved DSR network is used as a reference. We then introduce compromised stranger nodes into the network which doesn't forward the packets. The network should identify these malicious nodes and not upgrade them to known nodes. Simulations are carried out for the forwarding defection of the nodes. A discreet-event packet-level From figure 2, it is noticed that their an increase in the packet delivery ratio due to the using of the Relationship enhanced DSR (REDSR) protocol compared to the standard DSR protocol showing that the influence of the trust based routing to the DSR protocol.
The graph in figure 3 shows that a reduction in the amount of packets that are dropped by malicious nodes from the total dropped packets when using the Relationship enhanced DSR (REDSR) protocol.
From figure 4 , it is noticed that there is an increase in the network throughput due to the using of the Relationship enhanced DSR (REDSR) protocol compared to the standard DSR. 
Conclusion
Relationship enhanced DSR protocol enables the discovery of secure routes in a mobile ad hoc environment. Simulation results show that their an increase in the packet delivery ratio and the network throughput due to the using of the Relationship enhanced DSR protocol compared to the standard DSR protocol showing that the influence of the trust based routing to the DSR protocol.
Moreover, it is noticed that a reduction in the amount of packets that are dropped by malicious nodes from the total dropped packets when using the Relationship enhanced DSR protocol.
Furthermore, the proposed scheme of Relationship Enhanced DSR protocol increases the security in routing and also encourages the nodes to cooperate in
